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Non-technical summary
Productivity growth has been slow in many continental European countries over the last few
decades, especially in comparison with the United States. European countries such as Ger-
many and France have low capital performance as measured by capital productivity and vari-
ous rates of return. Improving productivity is important not only for shareholder value, but
also from a public policy perspective: In many countries, social security systems move away
from pay-as-you-go systems to more capital-funded systems, and therefore the rate of return
on capital will be even more important as a determinant of future generations’ welfare than in
the past.
It has been argued that lack of product market competition and poor corporate governance are
the two main reasons for slow productivity growth in continental Europe. However, predic-
tions from theoretical models are far from unambiguous, and empirical evidence is sparse, in
particular at the level of individual firms. This study tries to close this gap with an economet-
ric analysis of firm performance in Germany. Using a panel of almost 400 German manufac-
turing firms that covers the period 1986-94, we analyze how product market competition and
corporate governance affect the growth of total factor productivity.
Our empirical approach improves on existing empirical studies on corporate governance in
Germany in two important respects. First, the data set consists of listed and non-listed firms
which also differ in their legal forms. Hence, our analysis is not restricted to public companies
with limited liability whose shares are listed (börsennotierte Aktiengesellschaften). Second,
we recognize that product market competition and corporate governance are potentially en-
dogenous. To avoid biased regression results, we use an instrumental variables technique.
We find that firms which operate in more competitive product markets have a higher growth
of total factor productivity. This suggests that an increase in the intensity of competition
should result in productivity improvements. From this perspective, the ongoing integration of
the European Union, for example as a result of the common market, and of world product
markets are of particular importance for economic growth. In contrast to results from a similar
study by Nickell et al. (1997) for the U.K., we do however not find stable effects of proxy
variables for corporate governance on firm performance. There is even some evidence that in
our sample, ownership concentration reduces productivity. This might be due to the fact that
cross-holdings and pyramid ownership structures (which are very important in Germany) are
inefficient in monitoring managers, but more research on this mechanism is needed.
11. Introduction
Productivity growth has been slow in many continental European countries such as Germany
and France over the last few decades, especially in comparison with the United States. Im-
proving productivity is important not only to improve shareholder value, but also from a pub-
lic policy perspective: In most countries, social security systems move away from pay-as-you-
go financing and into partially or fully funded systems, and therefore the rate of return on
capital will be even more important as a determinant of future generations’ welfare than it has
been in the past (Feldstein and Samwick, 1997, and Börsch-Supan and Winter, 1999).
Many economists argue that there are two main reasons for poor firm performance in conti-
nental European countries: lack of product market competition and poor corporate governance
(see Baily and Gersbach, 1995, McKinsey Global Institute, 1997, Börsch-Supan, 1998, and
Allen and Gale, 1998). A number of theoretical papers investigate the effects of competition
and corporate governance on firm performance, but the theoretical predictions are far from
unambiguous. Moreover, empirical evidence is sparse, in particular at the level of individual
firms. In this paper, we aim to close this gap with an econometric analysis of firm perform-
ance in Germany. We use a unique panel data set with detailed information on almost 400
manufacturing firms over the 1986-94 period, and we apply an econometric approach which
allows us to alleviate endogeneity problems which typically plague empirical studies of firm
performance.
In order to get a preliminary understanding of productivity differences between countries, it is
helpful to look at how labor, capital, and factor productivity have evolved over time. Figures
1 through 4 show productivity comparisons between the U.S. as the leading Anglo-Saxon
economy and the continental European countries of Germany and France for 1970-95; the
productivity estimates are taken from McKinsey Global Institute (1997). Figures 1 and 2
demonstrate that the gap in capital productivity between Germany and the U.S. has been
much larger than the gap in labor productivity. Figure 3 suggests a possible reason for this:
capital intensity has been higher in Germany than in the U.S., favoring relatively high labor
productivity, while at the same time total factor productivity has been low. Taken together,
these figures show that labor and capital productivity have been higher in the U.S. than in
Germany and France throughout this entire period, leading to substantially higher total factor
productivity in the U.S. (Figure 4).
2Additional empirical evidence confirms that poor capital performance in Germany, France
and other continental European countries also results in low rates of return on capital (see
Mueller and Yurtoglu, 1998, and Börsch-Supan, 1998). In a comparative study of investment
behavior of German and U.S. firms, Nowak (1998) finds evidence for the notion that the U.S.
industrial sector is more efficient in making value-enhancing investment decisions. Nowak
argues that potential reasons for the fact that value generated by firm investment is so much
lower in Germany than in the U.S. are differences in corporate governance and in capital pro-
ductivity. Finally, sector-specific product market regulations in many European countries
constrain exposure to international competition and cause firms to innovate less and rely on
less efficient production processes which also reduces productivity growth (Baily and Gers-
bach, 1995).
There is quite a large body of theoretical work on the effects of corporate governance and
product market competition on firm performance. A number of models investigate whether
product market competition can improve managerial incentives and internal management
control. However, their results crucially depend on assumptions on owners’ and managers’
preference structures, specifically on their attitudes towards risk.1 Given the importance of the
issues and the inconclusive predictions from theoretical models, surprisingly little empirical
work has been done so far to investigate the interaction of corporate governance and product
market competition in their effect on productivity at the firm level. Nickell et al. (1997) are
the first to analyze this question directly using a panel of U.K. firms. To our knowledge, there
is no similar formal firm-level study of productivity growth for bank-based continental Euro-
pean economies, in particular for Germany, where corporate governance problems are judged
to be more severe than in market-based economies such as the U.K. or the U.S. (see, e.g., Ed-
wards and Fischer, 1994).
In this paper, we follow the approach of Nickell et al. (1997) and analyze the role of product
market competition and corporate governance as determinants of productivity growth in Ger-
man manufacturing firms. We restrict our attention to the manufacturing sector because pro-
ductivity dynamics in service industries are much more difficult to measure and to estimate in
empirical models. Our empirical approach improves on existing empirical studies on corpo-
rate governance in Germany (e.g., Cable, 1985, and Nibler, 1995) in two important respects, a
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 We provide a detailed review of the theoretical and empirical literature in section 2.
3very broad sample of firms, and an econometric technique which controls for endogeneity
problems.
Our empirical analysis is based on a new and detailed panel of 364 German manufacturing
firms covering the 1986-94 period. In contrast to all previous studies on firm behavior in
Germany, we do not restrict our attention to firms listed on the stock exchange. In our sample,
the number of these non-listed firms is substantial, reflecting their important role in the Ger-
man economy. Almost 20% of the firms in our sample are non-listed and run in the legal form
of a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), i.e. a private company with limited li-
ability. The remaining firms in the sample are run as a Aktiengesellschaft (AG), i.e. a public
company with limited liability, and of these 50% are not listed on the stock exchange. In ad-
dition to standard measures of productivity derived from the companies’ balance sheets, our
data set also contains information on the degree of competition in the firm’s product market,
measured at the four-digit industry level, and on ownership structure.2
In contrast to much of the existing empirical literature on corporate governance (excluding the
work by Nickell et al., 1997), our econometric approach allows to control for the endogeneity
of both product market competition and corporate governance.3 We estimate productivity
growth equations (derived from a constant returns Cobb-Douglas production function) using a
fixed-effects generalized method of moments estimator introduced by Arellano and Bond
(1991). While such an approach certainly does not solve all potential econometric problems,
we believe that it is a step in the right direction. Our main finding is that firms operating in
industries which are characterized by more intensive product market competition tend to see
higher rates of productivity growth. Direct effects of our proxy variables for corporate gov-
ernance on productivity are, however, weak.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the existing theo-
retical and empirical literature on the relationship between product market competition, cor-
porate governance and firm performance. Section 3 presents our empirical model and the
GMM estimation procedure, and section 4 contains our estimation results. Section 5 con-
cludes.
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 Köke (1999) provides additional details on the liability status and the ownership structure of the firms in our
dataset.
3
 Börsch-Supan and Köke (2000) provide a detailed discussion of endogeneity problems encountered in empiri-
cal studies of corporate governance.
42. Existing literature on the determinants of firm productivity
The aim of corporate governance is to overcome incentive problems generated by the separa-
tion of ownership and control in non-owner operated firms. The main mechanisms by which
corporate governance works are internal control and management compensation, designed to
align managers’ incentives with the owners’ goals (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However,
corporate governance may not always be effective. Factors like concentration of share owner-
ship, capital structure and board structure determine the owners’ incentives to incur the cost of
installing effective governance mechanisms.
Even in the presence of weak corporate governance, fierce product market competition may
act to align managers’ goals with the aim of efficient production; Allen and Gale (1998) pro-
vide a review.4 For example, Holmström (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show in a
setting with cost functions which are stochastic but identical across agents (or firms, respec-
tively) that perfect competition reveals full information to the owners about the realization of
common cost shocks. In this case, relative performance evaluation can induce optimal man-
agement performance. Hart (1983) compares two situations with independent and with posi-
tively correlated cost functions, respectively, showing that, when costs are correlated, compe-
tition reduces the amount of managerial slack. However, Scharfstein (1988) shows that Hart’s
results depend on the extent of managers’ assumed risk aversion. Scharfstein presents a model
which is similar to Hart’s but assumes a different utility function. The result is contrary to
Hart’s: Increased product market competition leads to more slack.
Hermalin (1992) identifies four mechanisms of the influence of product market competition
on management performance. These are an income effect of reduced profits in a more com-
petitive environment, a risk-adjustment effect if profit risks vary with the degree of competi-
tion, an effect of change in returns to managerial effort, and the effect of improved informa-
tion in the presence of more rival firms. None of these effects is unambiguous in the sense of
either reducing or increasing agency costs with increased competition, but Hermalin shows
that if the income effect is positive (i.e., if agency goods are normal) and dominates the other
three effects, then agency costs decrease with intensified competition. Schmidt (1997) ana-
lyzes the impact of competition on the threat of bankruptcy and resulting managerial effort.
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 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a more skeptical view.
5He finds that competition increases the likelihood of bankruptcy for inefficient firms and
should, therefore, improve management performance.
In summary, theoretical analyses of the effects of product market competition and corporate
governance on firm performance do not provide us with a clear prediction for the sign of these
effects. Turning to the existing empirical literature, Caves and Barton (1990), Caves (1992),
Green and Mayes (1991), Blundell et al. (1995) and Nickell (1996) present some evidence
that increased product market competition is associated with higher firm productivity or
higher productivity growth. The evidence on the effect of shareholder control on productivity
is mixed; see Short (1994) for a survey of the empirical literature on ownership and firm per-
formance. For example, Leech and Leahy (1991) find that better ownership control improves
firm performance.5 In a careful empirical study of the relationship between managerial owner-
ship and firm performance, Himmelberg et al. (1999) stress the fact that both ownership and
performance are determined endogenously by changes in the firm’s contracting environment.
Controlling for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, they find no evidence for
the notion that changes in managerial ownership affect firm performance.
Little empirical work has been done so far on the interaction of corporate governance and
product market competition in their influence on firm performance. Several authors, however,
have investigated the interaction of product market competition and firm capital structure.
This work may be informative for the topic we investigate since, following Jensen (1986), a
high degree of leverage is also regarded as a device of disciplining management. Chevalier
(1995a) finds that highly leveraged firms are weak competitors in the product market. How-
ever, this result also depends on the debt levels of other competitors (Chevalier, 1995b). Phil-
lips (1995) finds the same result as Chevalier (1995a) for three industries, but the opposite ef-
fect for a fourth industry. The evidence presented in Kovenock and Phillips (1997) indicates
that the interaction of firm leverage and product market competition is important in deter-
mining future firm performance. The results of Zingales (1998) support these findings. All
these empirical studies use data from the U.S.
Nickell et al. (1997) estimate the effect of product market competition, shareholder control,
and debt levels on firm-level productivity growth in the U.K., including interaction terms.
Their results show a positive influence of product market competition, ownership control, and
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 Leech and Leahy (1991) use a measure of the degree of ownership control proposed by Cubbin and Leech
(1983). We use the same measure in our empirical analysis; see section 3.
6financial pressure on productivity growth. In addition, they find evidence that both competi-
tion on product markets and financial pressure can substitute for internal control. In a similar
framework, Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) investigate how financial pressure affects firm be-
havior, also using data from the U.K. They find that an increase in financial pressure has a
large negative effect on employment while it has a small positive effect on productivity.
To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies on the interaction of product market compe-
tition and corporate governance available for continental European countries. As many studies
(e.g., Prowse, 1994, Edwards and Fischer, 1994) argue that control is much tighter in market-
based than in bank-based economies, it will be interesting to compare the findings Nickell et
al. (1997) obtained for the U.K. – a market-based economy – with our empirical findings for
Germany, an economy with a bank-based system of corporate governance and a complex
ownership structure characterized by cross-holdings and poor external control structures (see,
among others, Köke, 1999, for descriptive evidence on ownership structures in German manu-
facturing).
3. An empirical model of productivity growth
In this section, we present our empirical model of productivity growth. Our analysis follows
the approach by Nickell (1996) and Nickell et al. (1997). The empirical model is based on a
productivity growth equation derived from the firm’s production function, augmented with a
set of variables which capture the influence of product market competition and corporate gov-
ernance on productivity growth. There are two reasons for estimating growth equations. First,
measurement problems are much more severe for levels equations than for growth equations.
Second, measures of industry competition might well be endogenous with respect to the pro-
ductivity level, but we would argue that this endogeneity problem is less severe if productivity
growth is the dependent variable. Using the general framework described in this section, we
also estimated productivity level equations and obtained results which indicate that endoge-
neity problems are of some practical relevance, while the results reported in Section 4 demon-
strate that in growth equations, endogeneity problems can be controlled with a suitable in-
strumental variable estimation technique.
Specifically, we assume a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production function, and we esti-
mate the augmented growth version of this production function using a fixed-effects, gener-
alized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator to account for the potential endogeneity of the
explanatory variables. We augment the productivity growth equation with a number of time-
7varying, firm or industry specific variables that capture product market competition and cor-
porate governance.6 Nickell also includes changes of market share as a competition variable.
As we do not have data on market shares, all our variables are measures of the level of com-
petition. To measure product market competition, we use four variables. First, to control for
business cycle effects on competition, we use two-digit industry-level capacity utilization
rates (CYCLE). In our dataset, we have two measures of market concentration at the four-digit
industry level, the combined market share of the six largest firms in the industry (CR6), and
the industry’s Herfindahl index (HHI). We do acknowledge, however, that these measures do
not reflect all possible facets of competition, namely potential entry and firm conduct. In the
regressions reported below, we include only the concentration ratio since both measures are
highly correlated. Our results are not sensitive to this choice.
We also include total rents earned by the firm, normalized by total sales, which can be inter-
preted as an ex post measure of market power (RENTS). Finally, in some specifications, we
control for corporate governance and shareholder control using a measure proposed by Cub-
bin and Leech (1983). Specifically, we interact the RENTS variable with a dummy variable
CONTROL which takes the value 1 if control is tight, i.e., if the largest shareholder, based on
a probabilistic voting model, wins a decision with a probability of 95%. Note that in this
framework, other measures that might affect productivity growth such as the financial pres-
sure variables considered by Nickell et al. (1997) could also be included. We experimented
with such specifications as well, but we did not obtain robust results and therefore do not re-
port results.7
We now describe the empirical model and the estimation procedure in more detail. The start-
ing point of our analysis is a Cobb-Douglas production function with labor, N, and capital K,
as production factors. Y is output, A is total factor productivity. Firms are indexed by i, time
periods by t. Upper-case letters represent levels, lower-case letters logarithms. The Cobb-
Douglas production function then is
(1) Y N K Ait it it itN K= β β  .
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 A detailed description of these product market and corporate governance variables, and of all other variables
used in our empirical analysis, can be found in the data appendix.
7
 We return to this issue in section 4 where we present our empirical results.
8We transform this production function in several steps. We take logs and impose constant re-
turns to scale by setting βN = (1–βK) =: β0; in preliminary regressions, we ascertained that con-
stant returns are a valid assumption in our sample. We include lagged output as an explana-
tory variable to allow for endogenous persistence, using a weight λ. Finally, we allow for un-
observed firm effects, αi, and include an error term, εit, which is assumed to be uncorrelated
over time. This yields our basic log-linear empirical production function:
(2) y y n k ait it it it it i it= + − + − − + + +−λ λ β λ β α ε1 0 01 1 1( ) ( )( )  .
Next, we convert the production function (2) into its growth form by taking first differences;
this will also remove firm fixed effects, αi. We then parameterize productivity growth (i.e.,
the first difference of total factor productivity) as a linear function of time effects, a contem-
poraneous industry-specific business cycle proxy variable, and the set of lagged time and firm
or industry specific variables which capture differences in product market competition and
corporate governance8:
(3)
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Using specification (3), exploiting constant returns to scale and setting β* = (1–λ)β0, we fi-
nally obtain the differenced growth version of the constant returns Cobb-Douglas production
function (1):
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This equation could, in principle, be estimated using standard least-square panel data meth-
ods. However, as we suspect that explanatory variables such as product-market competition
and corporate governance are endogenous with respect to productivity growth, we use an in-
strumental variables method to estimate this equation. Lacking proper instruments, we are re-
stricted to using lagged endogenous variables as instruments. Specifically, we apply the gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Recall
that firm-specific effects are removed by forming first differences. In such a model, endoge-
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 While in our regressions, the only corporate governance variable considered is, due to limited data availability,
shareholder control, other variables could of course be entered in such an equation as will.
9nous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments provided there is no serial
correlation in the time-varying component of the error terms in equation (2). To ensure that
this condition is met, we test for serial correlation in the first difference residuals. We also test
for instrument validity using a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. Finally, the stan-
dard errors and t-tests we report are asymptotically robust to general heteroskedasticity.9
While in principle, this approach can deal with potential endogeneity problems in our appli-
cation, there is an important caveat. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that in autoregressive
models with persistent series, the first-difference estimator can be subject to finite sample bias
as a result of weak instruments, and that these biases could be greatly reduced by the inclusion
of levels equations in a GMM system estimation procedure (see, e.g., Bond et al., 1999). We
do not estimate a model with equations in both levels and first differences because of the
structure of our empirical model – as noted before, we assume that the level of competition in-
fluences productivity growth, following Nickell (1996) and Nickell et al. (1997). Hence,
while our formulation has the advantage that we do not have to compare levels of productivity
across firms and industries, but only changes in productivity, it has the disadvantage of po-
tentially weak instruments (which is, however, difficult to assess in a given empirical applica-
tion).
All regressions reported in the next section include interacted time and industry dummies (for
every year and for five one-digit industries).10 We use all available lags of y, n, and k as in-
struments (i.e., from t-2 up to t-9, depending on spell length). The other explanatory variables
are instrumented as well (with the exception of CR6, since its time-varying component is
small, and CONTROL which does not vary over time at all). Endogeneity concerns are most
relevant with respect to the rents variable that measures ex post market power. In the esti-
mates reported below, we use one lag of RENTS as instruments. We check for robustness of
this specification using zero and two lags of RENTS, and find that the results are not sensitive
to these variations.11 We also experimented with different definitions of the rents variable,
specifically those used by Nickell (1996), and with various measures of capital stock assum-
ing different rates of depreciation and using the inventory method described in Wadhwani and
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 The GMM estimates reported in this paper are computed using DPD98 for GAUSS (see Arellano and Bond,
1998).
10
 We do not include two-digit industry dummies because, in the smaller sample with ownership information, we
do not have sufficient observations per two-digit industry.
11
 If we use more than two lags, however, the hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected.
10
Wall (1986). The results, in particular statistical significance and sign of the rents variable,
turned out not to be sensitive to any of these robustness checks.
4. Empirical results
For estimation, we use an unbalanced panel of 364 manufacturing firms with 2217 observa-
tions covering the 1986-94 period; we refer to this panel as the full sample. There is also a
subsample of 136 firms (935 observations) for which we have ownership information. The
construction of these samples and the definitions of the variables we use in our regressions are
detailed in the data appendix.
The first model we report was estimated using the full sample of 364 firms in order to assess
the impact of product market competition on total factor productivity growth, not including
ownership variables (see table 1). In order to check the robustness of the production function
estimates, we first report a specification of the productivity growth equation which does not
include competition variables (column 1). When we include competition variables (column 2),
the input coefficient changes little, whereas the lagged output variable has a smaller coeffi-
cient in this specification.
We find a highly significant negative impact of the one period lagged RENTS variable on cur-
rent productivity growth. Recall that RENTS is an inverse measure of competition – the more
intensive competition on product markets, the smaller the rents that firms can appropriate.
Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that competition has a positive effect on produc-
tivity growth. The concentration ratio CR6 is, however, not significantly different from zero.
(The same is true if we include the industry Herfindahl index instead of the concentration ra-
tio; results are not reported.) The business cycle proxy is also insignificant. These insignifi-
cant coefficients might be due to the fact that the interacted time and industry dummies absorb
most of the variation in these industry-level variables. Also, as reported in the data appendix,
we were not able to assign competition variables to firms perfectly because we only have in-
dustry codes for the firms’ primary product industries.
In the third and fourth columns of table 1, we report results of the same regressions as in col-
umn 1 and 2, respectively, now using the smaller sample for which we have ownership data.
Here, we again find a highly significant negative effect of RENTS,  and insignificant effects
for the concentration ratio and the business cycle proxy. As the coefficient estimates are
qualitatively similar to those obtained for the full sample, we conclude that the reduced sam-
ple of firms for which we have ownership information should still provide reliable results.
11
Note that all versions of our GMM model are generally supported by the standard battery of
specification tests. The Sargan tests do not reject the hypothesis of instrument validity. Also,
the tests for serial correlation in the first difference residuals do not reject our specification:
As required, the first-order serial correlation of the (differenced) error terms is negative, and
the second-order correlation is zero. Finally, in all specifications we report, the slope coeffi-
cients and the sets of time and industry dummy variables are jointly significant according to
our Wald tests. In general, our results for the impact of competition (as measured by the
lagged rents variable) are also robust against variations of the lag length chosen for the in-
struments.
We now turn to the effects of corporate governance and ownership structure on productivity
growth. Table 2 reports regressions that augment the specification in column 4 of table 1 with
an interaction term of the RENTS variable with the Cubbin and Leech index of ownership
control (CONTROL), which is equal to one when ownership is highly concentrated (which is
the case for 62.5% of the observations). Here, we obtain a negative sign of the interacted term
which is significant at the 10% level. The RENTS variable, in contrast, is insignificant. These
findings indicate that competition has a positive effect on productivity growth (only) for those
firms which have concentrated ownership of their shares. When we do not include an interac-
tion term, but the control dummy directly, the effect of concentrated ownership is negative
and significant at the 5% level (table 2, column 2). If we introduce both variables individually
and an interaction term, the model is rejected by our specification tests.12
These results do not support the notion that, in the bank-based German economy, owners with
a dominant stake in the firm will enforce value maximization (here reflected in stronger pro-
ductivity growth). There are several potential explanations for this finding. Most importantly,
in our data set, high levels of ownership control might be associated with long control chains
and pyramid structures (see Köke, 1999) which lead to inefficiencies. In some instances, con-
centrated ownership might also be associated with high levels of managerial ownership, so
poor performance might be due to incentive problems known as managerial entrenchment
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, we lack the data to test formally for these effects.
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 Note that we obtain similar results if we use an alternative measure of control instead of the Cubbin-Leach in-
dex, namely a dummy variable for the fact that the largest shareholder owns more than 50% of the shares (which
is the case for 57.1% of all firms); these regressions are not reported here.
12
We also find a significant effect of product market competition on productivity growth; this
effect is, however, only significant for those firms which are under concentrated ownership.
Our findings are in sharp contrast to those of Nickell et al. (1997) for the market-based U.K.
system, and they indicate that the concentration of ownership may be harmful for productivity
growth of German firms. Taken together, these observations add weight to existing evidence
on the differential performance of Anglo-Saxon and continental European firms obtained in
aggregate or industry-level studies.
In addition to the specifications reported here, we also experimented with including a (lagged)
financial pressure variable as in Nickell et al. (1997) or Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), defined
as the ratio of interest paid and the sum of profit before taxes, depreciation, and interest paid.
In some specifications, we found a significant negative impact of financial pressure on pro-
ductivity growth. The negative effects we found were, however, not robust across specifica-
tions (i.e., the lag structure); we therefore do not report these results. Note that Nickell et al.
(1997) and Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) obtained a (small) positive effect of financial pres-
sure on productivity growth using U.K. data. For Germany, a negative effect of financial pres-
sure on productivity growth would not be entirely unreasonable – such a finding might, again,
be related to the dominance of banks in firm finance in Germany.13
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an empirical analysis of the effects of product market competition
and ownership control on total factor productivity growth using a panel data set of almost 400
German manufacturing firms over the 1986-94 period. We found a significantly negative im-
pact of rents appropriated by firms, indicating that product market competition has a positive
impact on productivity growth. The effects of industry concentration measures were insignifi-
cant, but this may be due to measurement problems (i.e., the fact that one cannot assign such
industry-level variables perfectly to firms). Using a smaller sub-sample of firms for which we
also have information on ownership structure, we found weak evidence that competition has a
positive effect on productivity growth for those firms which have concentrated ownership of
their shares. In addition, we found evidence that concentrated ownership has a negative direct
impact on productivity growth. Taken together, these findings suggest that product market
competition can compensate for the negative influence of dominant owners.
13
In our empirical model, the influence of competition is measured by (lagged) economic rents,
a firm-specific ex post measure. Because of the fact that even lagged economic rents are en-
dogenous, we used an instrumental variable technique to control for potential endogeneity.
The negative impact of lagged rents on productivity growth turned out to be extremely robust
against various alternative specifications. We are therefore confident that even though the
GMM method we apply might be subject to small sample biases, our main findings are reli-
able.
Our results have some strong policy implications. Most importantly, our findings add empiri-
cal support to some well-known hypotheses about the welfare effects of product market com-
petition (e.g., Allen and Gale, 1998, and Börsch-Supan, 1998). The implications for competi-
tion policy, in particular within continental Europe and the European Union at large, are obvi-
ous – increased competition in the common market should have positive effects on productiv-
ity growth. Regarding the effects of corporate governance (i.e., ownership structure), there is
clearly more research needed, and we make some suggestions below. Our results do, however,
suggest that in Germany, concentrated ownership does not imply tighter control and higher
productivity growth. Rather, in Germany’s bank-based system of internal control, concen-
trated ownership seems to be even harmful to firm performance.
We end this paper by discussing a few unresolved issues, and we indicate directions for future
research. First of all, it might come as a disappointment that other than ex post rents, all vari-
ables which measure industry-level competition were generally not significant. However, this
might be due to severe measurement problems: As noted before, the industry classification of
firms at the four-digit level according to their primary product is quite unreliable. Also, con-
centration measures can only indicate potential, not actual competition, whereas ex post rents
reflect the effects of the market power that a firm can actually exert. We would also argue that
not much progress can be made by considering alternative measures of the level of competi-
tion in a given industry. It seems more promising to look at changes in competition triggered
by exogenous events, but this approach is more suitable for industry-level studies than for a
sector-wide panel study of manufacturing firms. While there are, to our knowledge, as yet no
such case studies available for Germany, recent product market deregulations in the German
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 For example, Börsch-Supan (1998) reports that in Germany, creditors do not use their control potential to im-
prove firm productivity.
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telecommunications and energy markets, and in the European Union at large, might provide
data suitable for empirical studies in the future.
While we do not think that, for Germany, much better measures of industry-level competition
can be found, the effects of ownership structure and corporate governance should be explored
further, and a number of measurement problems need to be resolved.
First, it would be interesting to investigate what types of owners (private owners, other firms,
mutual or pension funds, banks, etc.) have the ability to ensure high productivity growth (see
Admati et al., 1994, for a theoretical model of a dominant owner’s influence, and Black,
1998, for a review of existing empirical work). Second, ownership structures are complex in
reality. For example, pyramid structures and cross-holdings are quite common in Germany,
and these structures can hardly be captured in a dummy variable such as the Cubbin-Leech
measure. Also, we consider only direct ownership which might be very different from ulti-
mate ownership. Köke (1999) presents some descriptive evidence on the complexity of own-
ership structures among both listed and non-listed manufacturing firms in Germany. Third,
changes in the ownership structure should have important effects on productivity growth, al-
though these changes are endogenous as well (see Himmelberg et al., 1999, for a careful
analysis). It should be worthwhile to identify changes of ownership structure and friendly
take-overs in a panel of German firms and investigate their effects on firm performance (hos-
tile take-overs are very rare in Germany). Fourth, ownership structure does not only affect
productivity growth, but also firm survival and market exit decisions (e.g., Winter, 1999). To
our knowledge, there are as yet no empirical studies that investigate any of these issues in a
systematic fashion for Germany, and they are well worth being explored in future research.
Finally, there might be much more complex interactions of ownership structures, board
structure, capital structure, and firm performance (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). For ex-
ample, as noted at the end of the previous section, we checked whether financial pressure has
any effect on productivity growth in our empirical model, but we did not find stable results. If
anything, we obtained weak evidence for a negative effect of financial pressure – in contrast
to the (small) positive effect reported by Nickell et al. (1997) and Nickell and Nicolitsas
(1999). A negative effect of financial pressure on productivity growth is, however, not en-
tirely unreasonable in Germany’s bank-based system of corporate governance (see Harhoff
and Körting, 1998, for an analysis of lending relationships in Germany). Direct measures of
bank influence should therefore be used to investigate the role of banks in future empirical
work.
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Data appendix
This study combines several sources of data. Data on the firms’ output and factor inputs are
obtained from the Bilanzdatenbank (balance sheet database) compiled by Hoppenstedt, a
German publishing company specializing in company and stock market information. This
commercially available database contains data from balance sheets and from profit and loss
statements of large German firms; in addition, it describes the structure of firms’ tangible as-
sets. For each legal entity submitting data, about 1000 variables from balance sheets and
profit and loss statements are available. For most firms, balance sheet data appear in
unconsolidated form, but a substantial number of firms also provide consolidated data. These
firms are, on average, larger and almost half of them (42.2%) are listed on the stock exchange.
In 1998, the Hoppenstedt database contained a total of 54,856 observations for the years
1980–1998. Data on the ownership structure of firms are taken from the Wegweiser durch
deutsche Unternehmen (guide through German companies) published annually by (formerly)
Hypobank, one of the largest German commercial banks. Finally, data on the structure of
firms’ output markets were taken from a biennial report by the German federal anti-trust
commission (Monopolkommission, 1996).
We restrict the empirical analysis to the period 1986–1994. All data used in this study refer to
the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. to West Germany before 1990 and to East and West
Germany from 1990 on. We choose 1986 as the starting year of our analysis because this is
the year when new accounting rules (the 1986 revision of §289 HGB) took effect, which
makes data before and after the change incomparable. The last period of our investigation,
1994, is again due to reasons of data comparability: After 1994, the classification of firms into
four-digit industries has changed.
In the Hoppenstedt database, the highest degree of consolidation is the world level for which
we have 5758 observations over the 1986–1994 period. This set of observations is the starting
point of our sample selection procedure (summarized in table A1). We focus on firms with
limited liability because within these firms, agency conflicts should be most severe (Berle and
Means, 1932). This restriction reduces the sample to 5658 observations. Eliminating observa-
tions for non-manufacturing firms leaves a sample of 3272 observations. Since the economet-
ric approach used in this study requires a minimum of three consecutive observations for each
firm and after eliminating missing data, the size of the final sample is reduced to 2217 obser-
vations for 364 firms.
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In contrast to all previous studies on corporate governance in Germany, we do not restrict our
attention to firms listed on the stock exchange. Table A2 lists the numbers of firms and obser-
vations in the full sample and in the subsample for which we have ownership information.
The numbers are substantial: More than 20% of the firms are run in the legal form of the
GmbH and non-listed, and more than 50% of the remaining firms which are run as Aktienge-
sellschaft (AG) are not listed on the stock exchange. We have detailed ownership information
on about one third of the firms covered. In those specifications which use information on
ownership structure, the sample size is further reduced to 935 observations (136 firms).
The average number of observations per firm is about seven: on average, there are 6.63 firm-
years in the unrestricted sample and 7.29 firm-years in the sample for which we have owner-
ship information (Table A3). Table A4 shows that observations are evenly distributed over
most years, exceptions being the years 1986 and 1987. We have fewer observations in these
years because firms had some discretion in adopting the new accounting standards; some
firms reported under the new rules as late as 1988.
The variables we use in our econometric analysis are constructed in analogy to Nickell et al.
(1997) wherever possible, in order to allow direct comparison with their results. Minor differ-
ences occur because we do not have stock market data to calculate the risk premium which
Nickell et al. include in their cost of capital variable. Since our sample contains a large num-
ber of firms not listed on the stock exchange, we could not obtain a market risk premium for
the entire sample. However, we feel that this limitation is compensated by the large number of
non-listed firms in the sample. We also choose a slightly different method to construct our
capital stock variable (see below).
Table A5 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. All
variables are appropriately deflated and measured in prices of 1991. Sources of price and cost
indexes and other aggregate variables are given below, together with details on how we con-
structed each variable used in our empirical analysis.
Output
The firm’s output, Y, is defined as total sales, deflated using a two-digit industry-specific pro-
ducer price index published by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, Fach-
serie 17, Reihe 2, 1998).
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Labor
The firm’s labor input, N, is defined as the total number of employees.
Capital stock
The firm’s capital stock, K, is defined as replacement costs of tangible assets including ma-
chines, buildings and land, deflated using a combined input price index for capital goods and
land, weighted by their empirical distribution (Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 17, Reihe 2,
and Fachserie 17, Reihe 4, 1998). Replacement costs of capital are calculated using the
method of Bond et al. (1999). They adjust the historical cost values for inflation and then ap-
ply a perpetual inventory method with a constant annual depreciation rate of 8%. Specifically,
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where Kt is the capital stock, pt is the price index for capital goods, It is real investment and δ
the depreciation rate. The starting value is the net book value of tangible assets, adjusted for
inflation in previous years.14
Business cycle proxy
To control for business cycle effects, we use a proxy variable, CYCLE, which is a survey-
based index of capacity utilization at the two-digit industry level. This index is part of the ifo
Geschäftsklima and was obtained from the ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, München.
Product market concentration
The concentration index, CR6, is a competition measure, defined as the sum of the six largest
shares in the firm’s product market (defined by four-digit output classes). These data are taken
from a biennial report by the Germany federal anti-trust commission (see Monopolkommis-
sion, 1996). These data are not fully comparable before and after 1994, when a change in in-
dustry classification occurred. Note that we cannot assign this competition measure perfectly
to each firm for two reasons. First, for the construction of this measure, the Anti-trust Com-
mission uses information on firms’ sales in individual market segments. Hence, there are sev-
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 We also experimented with capital stocks measures constructed following the approach proposed by
Wadhwani and Wall (1986); this is also the method used by Nickell et al. (1997). They do not assume a constant
rate of depreciation but also apply a perpetual inventory method. We also experimented with annual depreciation
rates of 4% and 12%. Our estimation results turned out to be robust against these alternative methods.
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eral competition measures for each firm depending on sales structure. Unfortunately, our main
source of data, the Hoppenstedt database, assigns firms only to one industry, the primary
product market. Hence, our competition measure may contain some classification error for
large firms. Second, the classification of industries used by the Anti-trust Commission differs
from the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) used in the Hoppenstedt database. Therefore,
we had to assign some firms on an individual basis.
Industry concentration
The four-digit industry Herfindahl index, HHI, is our second competition measure, again
taken from Monopolkommission (1996). The same remarks apply.
Degree of market power
We use rents (RENTS) earned by the firm as an ex post measure of the degree of competition.
The rents variable is defined as total sales less labor and capital costs, normalized by sales.15
Costs of capital are defined as the product of capital stock and user costs of capital which are,
in turn, defined as  the sum of the depreciation rate (δ=0.08) and the real interest rate meas-
ured as the difference of the rate of return on 10-year government bonds and the inflation rate.
Degree of control
The degree of owner control, CONTROL, is measured by the index suggested by Cubbin and
Leech (1983) and Leech and Leahy (1991). This measure is based on a probabilistic voting
model. The dummy variable CONTROL takes the value 1 if the largest shareholder wins a de-
cision among the owners with the probability of 99%. It is calculated using 



−
Φ
2
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the critical value of the standard normal distribution with Pi representing the largest share, Hi
the Herfindahl index and Φ being the normal cumulative distribution function.
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 Our definition of the rents variable is different from, and more natural than, the one used by Nickell (1996)
and Nickell et al. (1997). In these papers, rents are defined as the sum of profit before taxes, depreciation, inter-
est paid, and costs of capital, normalized by sales.
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Table 1: Effects of competition on productivity growth
Full sample Reduced sample
Variable
coefficient
(t-statistic)
coefficient
(t-statistic)
coefficient
(t-statistic)
coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant 0.012
(0.217)
-0.087
(0.687)
-0.021
(0.292)
-0.017
(0.081)
Sales (lagged) 0.439
(5.338)
0.337
(3.911)
0.313
(2.484)
0.218
(1.822)
Labor - capital 0.529
(5.951)
0.595
(6.409)
0.593
(4.273)
0.689
(5.922)
CR6 index (lagged) 0.042
(0.942)
0.023
(0.289)
Cycle 0.002
(1.423)
0.001
(0.252)
Rents (lagged) -0.099
(3.401)
-0.094
(2.072)
Wald test (significance
of slope coefficients)
350.54
df = 2, p = 0.000
423.74
df = 5, p = 0.000
92.76
df = 2, p = 0.000
160.18
df = 5, p = 0.000
Test for first-order
correlation of residuals
-2.697
df = 328, p = 0.007
-2.146
df = 328, p = 0.032
-2.260
df = 138, p = 0.024
-2.249
df = 138, p = 0.025
Test for second-order
correlation of residuals
-0.204
df = 286, p = 0.838
-0.249
df = 286, p = 0.803
-0.903
df = 132, p = 0.367
-0.895
df = 132, p = 0.371
Sargan test 83.141
df = 2, p = 0.444
96.072
df = 87, p = 0.237
92.859
df = 82, p = 0.194
102.575
df = 87, p = 0.122
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: GMM estimation using the Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include a full set of time
and industry dummies; Wald tests (not reported) do not reject joint significance of all dummies at the 1% level.
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Table 2: Effects of competition and ownership control on productivity
Reduced sample
Variable
coefficient
(t-statistic)
coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant 0.098
(0.487)
0.088
(0.403)
Sales (lagged) 0.133
(1.316)
0.152
(1.422)
Labor - capital 0.695
(6.088)
0.692
(5.970)
CR6 index (lagged) 0.012
(0.156)
0.005
(0.071)
Cycle -0.001
(0.345)
0.000
(0.156)
Rents (lagged) -0.008
(0.132)
-0.075
(1.468)
Rents * C99 (lagged) -0.098
(1.882)
C99 -0.058
(1.966)
Wald test (significance
of slope coefficients)
147.83
df = 6, p = 0.000
149.27
df = 6, p = 0.000
Test for first-order
correlation of residuals
-1.858
df = 138, p = 0.063
-1.934
df = 138, p = 0.053
Test for second-order
correlation of residuals
-0.909
df = 132, p = 0.363
-0.894
df = 132, p = 0.371
Sargan test 97.511
df = 86, p = 0.186
99.120
df = 86, p = 0.158
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: GMM estimation using the Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include a full set of time
and industry dummies; Wald tests (not reported) do not reject joint significance of all dummies at the 1% level.
25
Table A1: Sample selection
Selection criteria Observations
World-level consolidation 8782
Full disclosure under new rules (§289 HGB) 8318
Years 1986-1994 5758
Firms with limited liability (AG, GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG, KGaA) 5658
Manufacturing industries 3272
At least three consecutive observations 2755
No missing data items 2217
Source: Own calculations.
Table A2: Samples used for estimation
Firms Observations
Full sample 364 2217
– Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 290 1803
– Other (GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG, KGaA) 74 414
Subsample with ownership data 136 935
– Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 130 893
– Other (GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG, KGaA) 6 42
Source: Own calculations.
Table A3: Number of observations per firm
Observations per firm Full sample Reduced sample
3 108 21
4 168 24
5 320 85
6 384 114
7 483 238
8 376 192
9 378 261
Total 2217 935
Average number of observations 6.63 7.29
Source: Own calculations.
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Table A4: Number of observations by year
Year Full sample Reduced sample
1986 57 34
1987 122 61
1988 189 94
1989 251 112
1990 310 125
1991 337 131
1992 344 131
1993 315 126
1994 292 121
Total 2217 935
Source: Own calculations.
Table A5: Descriptive statistics
Full sample Reduced sample
Variable mean st.d. mean st.d.
Y (million DM) 3360 9020 3450 9580
N (number of employees) 12135 36439 12900 35000
K (million DM) 2900 9460 3360 11100
RENTS 0.63 0.16 0.60 0.16
CYCLE 0.86 0.05 0.86 0.05
CR6 0.42 0.25 0.42 0.24
HHI 0.00649 0.00771 0.00585 0.00735
CONTROL 0.63 0.48
Number of observations 2217 935
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: In prices of 1991.
